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United States v. Hotal: Determining the Role of
Conditions Precedent in the Constitutionality of
Anticipatory Warrants
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, I received a very interesting package in a post office box. Along with the usual mail, there was a ten-by-thirteen
inch brown envelope in a clear plastic bag. The bag containing
the envelope stated that the item had been damaged by sorting
machinery and offered the apologies of the United States Postal
Service. A stamped message on the envelope read: “Return to
Sender, Address Does Not Exist.” Knowing that I had not sent
the envelope but recognizing a poor attempt at spelling the
name of the company I worked for in the return address, I
opened it to find out whose mail it actually was. To my surprise, the envelope contained two pounds of compressed marijuana wrapped in numerous layers of plastic. I waited for my
attorney to arrive at my apartment and then turned the contraband over to the local police. Although my apartment was
never searched, I will never forget the anxiety I experienced
while still in possession of the marijuana, wondering if the police were going to kick in my door at any moment.
This experience gave me an insight into the sense of security the Fourth Amendment affords law-abiding citizens every
day by prohibiting unjustified police intrusions. But not everyone who receives two pounds of marijuana in their mailbox
does so by accident. As to those individuals who purposely receive contraband in the mail, society has an interest in making
sure that they are apprehended and convicted.
Under traditional search warrant analysis, when law enforcement officials become aware of contraband in transit to a
location, they have two options: they can either wait until the
contraband is delivered before attempting to obtain and execute a search warrant, or they can perform the search based
upon the “exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant re-
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quirement, and seize the contraband upon its arrival.1 Neither
is an ideal option. If officers wait until the contraband is delivered to the premises before attempting to obtain a search warrant, the evidence could be destroyed or distributed before the
warrant is issued and executed.2 If, on the other hand, they
perform a search based on exigent circumstances, a court might
find that no exigent circumstance existed, and consequently
suppress the evidence.3
In response to this catch-22, modern warrant analysis allows the issuance of an anticipatory warrant.4 An anticipatory
warrant is issued prior to, but is not to be executed until after,
the arrival of the contraband at the premises.5 While a traditional warrant is executed “forthwith,” an anticipatory warrant
is executed at some time in the future, if at all. For example,
instead of allowing law enforcement to search forthwith, the
magistrate issuing an anticipatory warrant may require that a
shipment of contraband currently in transit arrive at the desired location before allowing the warrant to be executed. If the
warrant is executed before the evidence has been delivered, or
if the evidence is never delivered, the warrant is void.6 The
events which must occur before the warrant can be executed,
such as the arrival of contraband, are referred to as the warrant’s “triggering event[s]”7 or “conditions precedent.”8
1. See United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081, 1086 (10th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1993).
2. See Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 10; United States v. Garcia 882 F.2d 699, 703
(2d Cir. 1989).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 3.7(c), at 363 (3d ed. 1996) (“The warrant is obtained in advance of the
anticipated time of delivery [of the evidence] so that it may be promptly executed when
the delivery is made.”).
6. See Garcia, 882 F.2d at 702. The conditions precedent may not occur if, for
example, upon attempting delivery of the contraband, law enforcement is informed that
the person the package is addressed to has moved.
7. United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997); see also
United States v. Hotal, 143 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998); Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12
(1st Cir. 1993).
8. See, e.g., Hotal, 143 F.3d at 1226 (requiring that package be received and
taken into residence prior to warrant’s execution); United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d
955, 965 (1st Cir. 1994) (requiring delivery by mail to, and receipt by, Daniel Gendron
of a specifically described parcel); Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 13 (invalidating an anticipatory warrant where the sole condition precedent was receipt of the package by the defendant without requiring that the package be received at the premises to be searched);
Garcia, 882 F.2d at 704 (upholding an anticipatory warrant where its conditions prece-
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The virtue of the anticipatory warrant is that it eliminates
law enforcement’s catch-22 while preserving Fourth Amendment protections. Because police now can obtain a warrant in
advance, they no longer are forced to choose between waiting
for a warrant and proceeding warrantless. Moreover, citizens
benefit through the neutral magistrate’s determination of
probable cause and specific authorization of where to search
and what to seize.
Although federal courts generally accept the constitutionality of anticipatory warrants,9 their place in the constitutional
framework is not clearly established. Federal circuit decisions
split as to whether an anticipatory warrant must give notice to
officers and defendants by expressly stating upon its face the
conditions upon which its execution is predicated (“particularity approach”),10 or whether it is sufficient that a judge consider
dent required only delivery of the contraband to the premises and not delivery to any
specific individual). In general, it can probably be said that conditions precedent are
merely a statement that the warrant cannot be executed until the contraband has arrived at the premises which the warrant authorizes to be searched.
9. All of the circuits that have addressed the issue have held that anticipatory
warrants are not per se unconstitutional. See Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 11; United
States v. Tagbering, 985 F.2d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Wylie, 919 F.2d
969, 974-75 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 903 n.6 (11th Cir.
1990); Garcia, 882 F.2d, at 703; United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir.
1988); United States v. Goff, 681 F.2d 1238, 1240 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193, 1194 (6th. Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Beal v. Skaff, 418 F.2d
430, 432-33 (7th Cir. 1969). Several state courts have also upheld the constitutionality
of anticipatory warrants. See Johnson v. State, 617 P.2d 1117 (Alaska 1980); State v.
Cox, 522 P.2d 29 (Ariz. 1974); Commonwealth v. Soares, 424 N.E.2d 221 (Mass. 1981);
People v. Glen, 282 N.E.2d 614 (N.Y. 1972).
10. This Note will repeatedly state that the particularity approach requires that
conditions precedent appear on the face of the warrant. Of course, this statement is
subject to the cure by affidavit doctrine which allows courts to consider in certain circumstances the specificity provided by the affidavit. See generally Larry EchoHawk &
Paul EchoHawk, Curing a Search Warrant That Fails to Particularly Describe the
Place to be Searched, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (1998). However, cure by affidavit does not
change the underlying requirement that the warrant “particularly describ[e] the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Hotal, 143 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1998), clearly understood this distinction when it first considered whether the affidavit could cure the warrant and then considered whether the Constitution required that conditions precedent
appear on the face of the warrant. See id. at 1225-26. It is with this understanding that
one must read the court’s holding that “in order to comply with the Fourth Amendment, an anticipatory search warrant must either on its face or on the face of the accompanying affidavit, clearly, expressly, and narrowly specify the triggering event.”
See id. at 1227. The portion of the holding stating that the conditions precedent must
appear on the face of the warrant relates to the court’s consideration of a time-based
particularity requirement. The portion of the holding which states “or on the face of the
accompanying affidavit” relates to the court’s consideration of cure by affidavit. It is
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the warrant’s conditions precedent in determining probable
cause (“probable cause approach”).11 In United States v. Hotal,12
the Ninth Circuit adopted a particularity approach, requiring
that an “anticipatory search warrant must . . . on its face . . .
clearly, expressly, and narrowly specify the triggering event.”13
This Note agrees with the Ninth Circuit’s decision. Part II of
this Note provides background on the Fourth Amendment and
how the terms of the amendment apply to anticipatory warrants. Part III describes the facts of Hotal and outlines the
court’s reasoning in reaching its conclusion. Part IV analyzes
the particularity and probable cause approaches. Finally, part
V concludes that the Ninth Circuit was correct in adopting the
particularity approach.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects citizens from “unreasonable searches and seizures”14
the purpose of this Note to consider the Constitutional issue of whether conditions
precedent must appear on the face of the warrant. The issue of when an affidavit can
cure a faulty warrant is left for another day. However, it must be admitted that due to
the interaction of the two issues, the only time a court’s approach to conditions precedent will be outcome determinative is when the warrant does not list the conditions
precedent and the affidavit cannot be used to cure it. See, e.g., id.
11. Although there may be some problems with the Ninth Circuit’s categorization
of the courts, see infra note 74, it is generally correct. In United States v. Hotal, 143
F.3d 1223, the Ninth Circuit divided the courts into two groups: those that require the
conditions precedent to appear on the face of the warrant, and those that do not. The
court placed itself and the First Circuit in the category of those courts that require
conditions precedent to appear on the face of the warrant. See Hotal, 143 F.3d at 1226
(citing Gendron, 18 F.3d at 965 (1st Cir. 1994), for the proposition that the First Circuit
had adopted the “on-the-face” requirement); but see United States v. Vigneau, 1999 WL
508810, at n.8 (1st Cir. (R.I.)) (stating that the Ninth Circuit had misinterpreted its
holding). The court placed the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits in
the category of courts that do not require the conditions precedent to appear on the face
of the warrant. See id. (citing United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir.
1997); Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1086-87 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Moetamedi,
46 F.3d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Tagbering, 985 F.2d 946, 950 (8th Cir.
1993); United States v. Rey, 923 F.2d 1217, 1221 (6th Cir. 1991)).
12. 143 F.3d 1223 (1998).
13. Id. at 1227. For an explanation of the editing, see supra note 10.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The full text of the amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
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by representatives15 of either the federal or state government.16
Subject to few exceptions,17 a search can be conducted only pursuant to a validly issued search warrant.18 A warrant alone,
however, is not enough. The framers recognized that a search
pursuant to a warrant could violate personal rights as much as

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

Id.
15. Although this Note focuses on the Fourth Amendment’s role in law enforcement, the protections of the Fourth Amendment also limit the activities of other governmental actors such as school teachers. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
(1985).
[T]his Court has never limited the Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable
searches and seizures to operations conducted by the police. Rather, the Court has
long spoken of the Fourth Amendment’s strictures as restraints imposed upon
‘governmental action’that is, ‘upon the activities of sovereign authority.’ Accordingly, we have held the Fourth Amendment applicable to the activities of civil as
well as criminal authorities: building inspectors, Occupational Safety and Health
Act inspectors, and even firemen entering privately owned premises to battle a
fire, are all subject to the restraints imposed by the Fourth Amendment.
....
. . . If school authorities are state actors for purposes of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of expression and due process, it is difficult to understand
why they should be deemed to be exercising parental rather than public authority
when conducting searches of their students.

Id. at 335-36 (citations omitted).
16. The Fourth Amendment originally acted as a limit only upon the activities of
the federal government. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973). However,
with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the proscriptions of the Fourth
Amendment have been applied to state government as well as the federal government.
See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (“The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in ‘the concept of ordered liberty’ and as
such enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause.”), overruled by
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to the states).
17. See Michael J. Flannery, Note, “Bridged Too Far: Anticipatory Search Warrants and the Fourth Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 781, 789-90 (1991); see, e.g.,
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (outlining the nature of the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (recognizing that the Court has “permitted exceptions when ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable’ ” (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concuring in judgment))); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982) (holding that warrantless
searches of automobiles are constitutional as long as the search is “based on facts that
would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not actually been
obtained”).
18. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984) (“Prior decisions of this
Court . . . have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are ‘few in
number and carefully delineated.’ ” (quoting United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972))).
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a search without a warrant.19 In explaining the framers’ concerns with English warrant law, the Supreme Court noted that
the general warrant specified only an offense . . . and left to
the discretion of the executing officials the decision as to
which persons should be arrested and which places should be
searched. Similarly, the writs of assistance used in the Colonies noted only the object of the search—any uncustomed
goods—and thus left customs officials completely free to
search any place where they believed such goods might be.
The central objectionable feature of both warrants was that
they provided no judicial check on the determination of the
executing officials that the evidence available justified an intrusion into any particular home.20

Therefore, the Fourth Amendment contains additional requirements that define the nature of a warrant: “[N]o Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.”21 These requirements
further limit law enforcement authority by requiring independent judicial determination of probable cause and the appropriate scope of the search. This “ensures that the search is carefully tailored to its justification, and does not resemble the
wide-ranging general searches that the Framers intended to
prohibit.”22 The additional protections which apply when a
warrant is issued make the obtainment of a warrant a preferred practice; hence, courts have been willing to accept the
idea of issuing anticipatory warrants rather than allowing the
police to perform warrantless searches under the exigent circumstances exception.23
B. ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANTS
1. Search Warrant Defined
An anticipatory search warrant “is a warrant based upon
19. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981).
20. Id.
21. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
22. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 963 (1984).
23. See United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Courts—
although not yet the Supreme Court, to be sure—have upheld the anticipatory warrant, in large part, because they see it as desirable, whenever possible, for police to obtain judicial approval before searching private premises.”).
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an affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time,
but not presently, certain evidence of crime will be located at a
specified place.”24 This type of warrant enables law enforcement to do two important things: (1) obtain the search warrant
before the evidence has reached the location to be searched and
(2) search a premise as soon as the evidence reaches the location. By allowing the police to do these two things, anticipatory
search warrants eliminate a catch-22: “whether, on the one
hand, to allow the delivery of contraband to be completed before obtaining a search warrant, thus risking the destruction or
disbursement of evidence in the ensuing interval, or, on the
other hand, seizing the contraband on its arrival without a
warrant, thus risking suppression.”25 Recognizing that the purposes of the Fourth Amendment are better served when the
acts of law enforcement are reviewed by a neutral magistrate,
courts have favored the policy of obtaining anticipatory warrants.26 Still, courts have had difficulty outlining Fourth
Amendment anticipatory warrant requirements.
2. Anticipatory search warrants and the warrant requirements
Even though the anticipatory search warrant is a special
type of warrant, it is still a “warrant,” bound by the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement that “no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and . . . things to be seized.”27 These two requirements, probable cause and particularity, generally apply
to both anticipatory and traditional warrants; however, there
are some special considerations.
a. The particularity requirement. The particularity requirement demands that in order for a warrant to be valid,
“nothing [can be] left to the discretion of the officer executing
the warrant.”28 The warrant must contain a specific description
24. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 3.7(c), at 362; see also Garcia, 882 F.2d at 702 (“An
anticipatory warrant, by definition, is a warrant that has been issued before the necessary events have occurred which will allow a constitutional search of the premises; if
those events do not transpire, the warrant is void.”).
25. United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1993).
26. See Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added); see Garcia, 882 F.2d at 704 (holding that “as with other search warrants, anticipatory warrants require that a magistrate give careful heed to the fourth amendment’s [particularity] requirement . . . .”).
28. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (quoting Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)).
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of which location can be searched and what items can be seized.
This means, for example, that if contraband is in a building
which police know or reasonably should know is divided into
subunits, the warrant can authorize a search of only those
units for which probable cause exists.29 Discretion cannot be
given to the police to decide which units to search when they
arrive on the premises.
At least one court, however, has allowed for limited police
discretion when issuing an anticipatory warrant for a multiunit
dwelling. In United States v. Dennis,30 the Seventh Circuit upheld an anticipatory warrant that described the place to be
searched as the “first floor apartment or second floor apartment depending on conditions being met which are expressed
in the application.”31 The application affidavit requested “permission to search the first floor apartment if and only if an occupant of that apartment accepts delivery or opens the package
or the second floor apartment if and only if an occupant of the
second floor accepts delivery or opens the package.”32 The court
upheld the warrant even though the warrant obviously left
some discretion to the executing officers in deciding which subunit to search. Whether this type of discretion is appropriate in
the context of an anticipatory warrant needs further consideration before the anticipatory warrant is settled in constitutional
law.33
b. The probable cause requirement. Anticipatory warrants
also must meet the probable cause requirement. Most early objections to anticipatory warrants were based upon this requirement. Two methods of attack commonly used by defendants are (1) that the magistrate must have “probable cause to
believe that the contraband to be seized is in the place to be
searched at the time a warrant issues” and (2) that probable
cause to search one place can never exist when the contraband

29. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987).
30. 115 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 1997).
31. Id. at 529 n.1.
32. Id. at 528. Even though the warrant referred to the terms in the application,
there was no evidence that the application actually accompanied the warrant to the
scene of the search. The failure of the application, which contained the conditions, to
accompany the warrant to the scene of the search may present a problem of its own.
See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
33. For a discussion of what type of discretion, if any, should be allowed in the
context of anticipatory warrants, see infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
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is currently known to be located at another.34 At first glance
the arguments may appear to be the same, but they are different. The first argument deals with what the magistrate must
believe, the second argument goes to how certain that belief
must be, or in other words, what is probable cause. Despite
these differences, the two contentions do have one thing in
common—they both have been rejected by the federal circuit
courts.35
(1) Probable cause to believe the contraband is at the
targeted location of the search when the warrant is issued. The
courts have noted that the Fourth Amendment does not expressly require that the evidence “presently be located at the
premises to be searched.”36 Any such claim can only be implied
from terms in the amendment.37 If the defendant claims that
the requirement arises under the probable cause language of
the Amendment, the issue merges into the question of what is
probable cause, the focus of the second of two arguments discussed below. The only other potential source of this requirement is the unreasonableness clause. In response to this approach, courts have held that “[t]here is nothing unreasonable
about authorizing a search for tomorrow, not today, when reliable information indicates that . . . the [evidence] will reach the
house, not now, but then.”38 On the more practical side, courts
have noted that all that has ever been required is that the evidence likely will “be found at the described locus at the time of
the search.”39
If defendants rely on the probable cause language of the

34. United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1993).
35. See id.; United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir. 1989); United
States v. Washington, 852 F.2d 803, 804 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Lowe, 575
F.2d 1193, 1194 (6th Cir. 1978).
36. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 10.
37. See United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 965 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that
the Constitution requires that “a search must not be ‘unreasonable,’ and that warrants
must be supported by ‘probable cause,’ ” but it does not require that the warrant be executable upon issuance (quoting U.S. CONST. amend IV)).
38. Id.; see also Lowe, 575 F.2d at 1194 (“Contraband does not have to be presently located at the place described in the warrant if there is probable cause to believe
that it will be there when the search warrant is executed.”).
39. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 10 (emphasis omitted). Probable cause does not require a certainty that the evidence will be at the described location, it merely requires
a probability that it will be at the location. See id. The Supreme Court has described
the standard as one of a “fair probability that contraband . . . will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
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Fourth Amendment in arguing that evidence must be located
on the premises when the warrant is issued, then the only issue is when probable cause to issue a warrant really exists. If,
on the other hand, defendants rely on the “unreasonable” language, the present location of the evidence “is immaterial, so
long as ‘there is probable cause to believe that it will be there
when the search warrant is executed.’ ”40 In this case, the court
must determine what constitutes probable cause that the evidence will be at the specified location when the search warrant
is executed.
(2) Determining whether probable cause can exist before
the contraband has reached the locus of the search. To issue any
warrant, the magistrate must be convinced beyond a “bare suspicion” that the evidence will be located on the premises at the
time of the search.41 In making her decision, the magistrate
must consider whether a person of reasonable caution would
believe that the evidence is likely to be at the premises to be
searched when the warrant is executed.42 For an anticipatory
warrant, this means that the magistrate must have a credible
reason for believing that although the evidence is not currently
located on the premises, it will be there when the warrant is
executed.43
The courts have “adopt[ed] the ‘sure and irreversible course’
standard” for judging the validity of anticipatory warrant probable cause determinations.44 When the contraband is on a sure
and irreversible course to the premises to be searched, it is
likely that the evidence of a crime will be “at the described locus at the time of the search.”45 As the First Circuit explained,
[T]he sure course standard functions as a proxy for the actual
presence of the contraband at the locus to be searched. It offers the magistrate a trustworthy assurance that the contraband, though not yet on the site, will almost certainly be located there at the time of the search, thus fulfilling the
40. Garcia, 882 F.2d at 702 (citing Lowe, 575 F.2d at 1194 ).
41. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
42. See id.
43. See Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12.
44. Id. at 13; see also United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1427-28 (7th Cir.
1996); United States v. Wylie, 919 F.2d 969, 974 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 903 n.6 (11th Cir. 1990); Garcia, 882 F.2d at 702-03; United
States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d
1465, 1468 (9th Cir. 1986).
45. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 10 (emphasis omitted).
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requirement of future probable cause.46

Generally, the “sure and irreversible course” standard is
met when law enforcement has current possession of the contraband and is in control of its delivery. For example, when the
government has conducted a child pornography sting operation
and is actually the entity filling orders,47 the chance that the
evidence will not be delivered to the premises is minimal, since
law enforcement officers realize that the contraband must be
delivered before the search can begin. The standard is also met
when drugs, intercepted by postal inspectors, are then delivered to the defendant under controlled circumstances.48 Since
evidence does not have to be at the location when the warrant
is issued, and because there can be probable cause to justify issuing an anticipatory warrant, anticipatory warrants are not
per se unconstitutional.49 The question becomes whether any
additional constitutional or non-constitutional requirements
should be imposed on the issuance of anticipatory warrants.
c. Conditions precedent: an additional requirement for the
issuance of anticipatory warrants.50 Since there is a greater
46. Id. at 13.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Ruddell, 71 F.3d 331 (9th Cir. 1995); Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 8; United States
v. Koelling, 992 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195
(4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1988).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423 (7th Cir. 1996) (intercepting
marijuana being shipped from Texas to Illinois); United States v. Becerra, 97 F.3d 669
(2d Cir. 1996) (intercepting cocaine shipped from Columbia to New York); United
States v. Moetamedi, 46 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 1995) (intercepting drugs being express
mailed from Pakistan to New York); United States v. Lawson, 999 F.2d 985 (6th Cir.
1993) (intercepting drugs being express mailed); United States v. Tagbering, 985 F.2d
946 (8th Cir. 1993) (intercepting marijuana sent from Jamaica to Kansas City); United
States v. Wylie, 919 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1990) (intercepting cocaine shipped via the
United Parcel Service from Texas to Minnesota); United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699
(2d Cir. 1989) (intercepting cocaine shipped from Panama); United States v. Lowe, 575
F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1978) (intercepting heroin being sent from Thailand to Detroit).
49. See Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 11 (finding “it unsurprising that every circuit to
have addressed the question has held that anticipatory search warrants are not categorically unconstitutional”) (citing as examples Tagbering, 985 F.2d at 950; United
States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 903 n.6 (11th Cir. 1990); Wylie, 919 F.2d at 974-75;
Goodwin, 854 F.2d at 36; United States v. Goff, 681 F.2d 1238, 1240 (9th Cir. 1982);
Lowe, 575 F.2d at 1194; United States ex rel. Beal v. Skaff, 418 F.2d 430, 432-33 (7th
Cir. 1969); see also Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703.
50. It should be noted that anticipatory warrants can be prohibited or limited by
the terms of a state constitution or a statute. See, e.g., United States v. Hugoboom, 112
F.3d 1081, 1085 n.5 (10th Cir. 1997) (due to the circumstances of the case, the court did
not decide whether anticipatory warrants violated Article I, Section 4, of the Wyoming
Constitution); Kostelec v. State, 703 A.2d 160 (Md. 1997) (holding that MD. CODE ANN.
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chance of abuse with an anticipatory warrant than a traditional warrant,51 courts have required that the triggering
events, or conditions precedent, be “explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so as to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation
by government agents.”52 Although the “conditions precedent . . . are integral to [an anticipatory warrant’s] validity,”53
courts are split as to how this requirement should be treated.
(1) The probable cause approach to conditions precedent.
The majority of the circuits view the conditions precedent as
“mere guarantees that the probable cause determination at the
time of issuance has reached fruition when the warrant is executed.”54 By the term “mere,” these courts mean that the conditions precedent are needed only for the magistrate to determine in the first instance that probable cause to search will
exist when the warrant is executed, and in the second instance
that probable cause did exist when the warrant was executed.
Since the conditions precedent are merely determinations of
probable cause, they do not have to be included in the warrant
as the place, person, and items must be.55 Under this approach,
as long as the magistrate concludes that the fulfillment of the
conditions precedent ensures the existence of probable cause at
the time of a warrant’s execution and the conditions are followed by the executing officers, the anticipatory warrant is
valid.56 The reasoning behind this approach has never been
art. 27, § 551 (1997) does not allow for the issuance of anticipatory warrants). When
the prohibition is due to statute only, legislatures may quickly change the permissibility of issuing anticipatory search warrants. Compare State v. Scott, 951 P.2d 1243,
1247 (Haw. 1998) (holding “that the plain and unambiguous language of [HAW. REV.
STAT.] § 803-31 does not permit the issuance of an [anticipatory search warrant]”), with
State v. Opupele, 967 P.2d 265 (Haw. 1998) (noting that HAW. REV. STAT. § 803-31
(1998) had been amended since the Scott decision earlier in the year, and now allowed
the issuance of anticipatory search warrants). The purpose of this note, however, is to
address the place of the anticipatory warrant in the framework of the Constitution.
51. See Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12.
52. Id. at 12 (citing Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703-04).
53. United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1997).
54. United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998); see Dennis,
115 F.3d at 529; Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1086-87; United States v. Moetamedi, 46 F.3d
225, 229 (2d Cir. 1995); Tagbering, 985 F.2d at 950; United States v. Rey, 923 F.2d
1217, 1221 (6th Cir. 1991).
55. See United States v. Hotal, 143 F.3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that
“although some of the circuits have suggested that it would be more ‘efficient’ or preferable for an anticipatory warrant to state on its face the conditions necessary for its
execution, none has found the failure to do so to constitute a Fourth Amendment violation”) (citations omitted).
56. See Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1087; Rey, 923 F.2d at 1221.
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completely explained,57 but it does have the appearance of a “no
harm, no foul” approach to the Fourth Amendment. Courts
have upheld anticipatory warrants in situations where the affidavit contained the conditions precedent and it was shown after the search that the conditions precedent had occurred prior
to the warrant’s execution,58 and where the magistrate orally
informed the police of the conditions precedent and it was demonstrated that they had been met.59
(2) The particularity approach to conditions precedent.
The other approach to conditions precedent is to require that
the conditions appear on the face of the warrant, and not just
in the affidavit.60 This approach essentially writes a new particularity requirement into the Fourth Amendment. In addition
to requiring the warrant to particularly describe the place to be
searched and items to be seized, the warrant must also particularly describe the conditions precedent for execution. If the
warrant does not contain the conditions precedent for execution, the warrant is void.61 In United States v. Hotal, the Ninth
Circuit decided between these two approaches.62
57. The Sixth Circuit has never fully explained why it adopted the probable
cause approach. See Rey, 923 F.2d at 1221. In Rey, the court found that conditions
precedent do not have to appear on the face of the warrant when a “reasonable inference can be made that the warrant authorizes a search only after the controlled delivery has occurred.” Id. What the court failed to explain was how a “reasonable inference” related to the constitution.
58. See Moetamedi, 46 F.3d 225.
59. See United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423 (7th Cir. 1996).
60. See United States v. Hotal, 143 F.3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that
“when a warrant’s execution is dependent on the occurrence of one or more conditions,
the warrant itself must state the conditions precedent to its execution”).
61. See id. at 1227. As with the other particularity requirements, however, this
statement is subject to the cure by affidavit principle which allows courts to consider in
certain circumstances the specificity provided by the affidavit. See supra note 10. Although all the circuits agree that an insufficiently particular warrant can be cured by
the terms in the affidavit under certain circumstances, the circuits vary in the standard they require for cure by affidavit. See EchoHawk & EchoHawk, supra note 10, at
14-22. Some courts require that the affidavit be incorporated by, and accompany, the
warrant to the locus of the search if it is to cure the warrant’s description. See United
States v. McGrew, 122 F.3d 847, 849-50 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Morris, 977
F.2d 677, 681 n.3 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 60, 64 (3d Cir.
1982). Other circuits merely require that the circumstances surrounding the execution
of the warrant demonstrate the functional equivalence of having the affidavit incorporated by, and accompanying, the warrant for cure by affidavit to occur. See United
States v. Jones, 54 F.3d 1285, 1291 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d
1112, 1116-17 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1351 n.6
(11th Cir. 1982).
62. 143 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1998).
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III. UNITED STATES V. HOTAL
A. Facts

As part of a government sting operation, mailings were sent
to certain individuals, offering them the chance to purchase
child pornography. In response to this mailing, the government
received a request for two videotapes from John David Hotal.63
To complete the sting, postal inspectors planned a controlled
delivery of the videotapes and, on January 23, 1996, sought an
anticipatory search warrant of Mr. Hotal’s residence.64
In the application affidavit for the anticipatory search warrant, United States Postal Inspector Rhonda Bowie stated that
the package containing the two videotapes would be delivered
the following day around one o’clock.65 “The affidavit further
stated that the package [would] be kept under surveillance”
until it was received by an individual at the residence and
taken inside, at which time the warrant would be executed.66
Although the application was for an anticipatory warrant, the
warrant actually issued by the magistrate directed that the
premises be searched “forthwith.”67 The warrant contained no
statement that it was an anticipatory warrant, nor any description of the conditions precedent for its execution.68
On January 24, 1996, the videotapes were delivered to Hotal, who signed for them and took them inside his residence. A
few minutes later, Bowie and several other officers executed
the warrant. Although the warrant stated that “Bowie’s affidavit was attached and incorporated by reference,” the record
contained no evidence that the affidavit accompanied the warrant to the scene of the search.69
Hotal filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized in the
search. One of the grounds for the motion was “that the warrant failed to specify that it was not to be executed until after
the delivery of the videotapes.”70 The trial court denied Hotal’s

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See id. at 1224.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1224-25.
Id. at 1225.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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motion to suppress, and he subsequently was found guilty of
receiving and possessing child pornography. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the motion
to suppress.
B. The Court’s Reasoning
The Ninth Circuit addressed two issues: (1) whether the
application affidavit could cure the warrant, and (2) whether
the warrant was constitutionally sufficient.
Concerning the first issue, the court rejected the government’s contention that the problems with the warrant could be
cured by the affidavit. Although the warrant incorporated the
affidavit and stated that the affidavit was attached, as required
for an affidavit to cure a warrant in the Ninth Circuit, no evidence in the record showed that the “affidavit had accompanied
the warrant at the time of search.”71 The court’s previous decisions show that the government must prove that circumstances
for cure by affidavit were present.72 Since the government had
not met its burden of proof, the court would not allow the affidavit to be considered in determining the sufficiency of the
warrant.
The court next addressed the issue of the constitutionality
of the warrant itself. The issue of “whether an anticipatory
search warrant lacks sufficient particularity when it does not
identify the event on which the execution of the warrant is
conditioned and when instead it erroneously authorizes the
search ‘forthwith’ ”73 was one of first impression in the Ninth
Circuit. The court, however, was not without guidance. Noting
a split among the circuits as to the appropriate standard of
constitutionality,74 the Ninth Circuit was influenced by the
71. Id. at 1225.
72. See id. at 1225-26 (citing United States v. McGrew, 122 F.3d 847, 849-50 (9th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Van Damme, 48 F.3d 461, 465-66 (9th Cir. 1995)).
73. Id. at 1226.
74. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text. Categorizing the circuits is not
a simple matter because the issue of conditions precedent can become entangled with
the issue of cure by affidavit. In the case cited by the Ninth Circuit for the proposition
that the Second Circuit does not require the conditions precedent to appear in the warrant, it is unclear whether the Second Circuit made the determination based on a view
of conditions precedent or cure by affidavit. Compare Hotal, 143 F.3d at 1226, with
United States v. Moetamedi, 46 F.3d 225, 228-29 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing as authority
Eighth Circuit cases dealing with both anticipatory warrants and cure by affidavit in
general). The cases cited by the Ninth Circuit for the proposition that the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits do not require conditions precedent to appear on the warrant were
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First Circuit rule that “when a warrant’s execution is dependent on the occurrence of one or more conditions, the warrant itself must state the conditions precedent to its execution and
these conditions must be clear, explicit, and narrow.”75
In explaining its holding that a warrant’s conditions precedent must appear on its face, the Ninth Circuit relied upon the
purposes behind the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement:76 namely, to limit the discretion of the executing officers and to inform the person subject to the search of its justifiable scope.77 The court also held that a violation of a condition
precedent is as great an intrusion upon personal rights as an
improper description of the place to be searched. 78
IV. ANALYSIS

An anticipatory warrant’s conditions precedent are essential to its validity.79 However, courts differ on whether the conclearly decided based upon cure by affidavit principles and not on an independent
analysis of conditions precedent. Compare Hotal, 143 F.3d at 1226, with United States
v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 528-29 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the failure of the warrant
to list the conditions precedent was cured by the affidavit); United States v. Tagbering,
985 F.2d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the affidavit was incorporated by the
warrant so it could be considered as part of the warrant). However, it is clear that the
Seventh Circuit does not require conditions precedent to appear on the face of the warrant independent of cure by affidavit considerations. See United States v. Leidner, 99
F.3d 1423, 1427 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the court was “not compelled by the Constitution to require [the conditions precedent to appear in the warrant] since all that is
constitutionally required is that the search warrant be supported by probable cause”).
Unlike some circuits, the Tenth Circuit is easy to categorize. In dealing with cure by
affidavit, the Tenth Circuit has held that “the affidavit and search warrant must be
physically connected so that they constitute one document . . . and . . . the search warrant must expressly refer to the affidavit and incorporate it by reference using suitable
words of reference.” United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 603 (10th Cir. 1988) (citations
omitted). In dealing with the question of conditions precedent, the Tenth Circuit imposed no such restrictions, relying solely upon the appearance of the conditions precedent in the affidavit. See United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081, 1087 (10th Cir.
1997).
75. Hotal, 143 F.3d at 1226; but see United States v. Vigneau, 1999 WL 508810,
at n.8 (1st Cir. (R.I.)) (stating that the Ninth Circuit had misinterpreted its holding in
United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1993)).
76. See id. at 1227.
77. See id. (citing McGrew, 122 F.3d at 850).
78. Id. (noting the equal constitution requirement that “all parties be advised
when the search may first take place, and the conditions upon the occurrence of which
the search is authorized and may lawfully be instituted”).
79. See United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that
the “conditions precedent . . . are integral to [an anticipatory warrant’s] validity”); see
also Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1085 (holding that anticipatory warrants are not per se
unconstitutional “so long as the conditions precedent to execution are clearly set forth
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ditions precedent are to be treated solely as a matter of probable cause, or whether the conditions precedent should be
treated as a time-based particularity requirement.80 This Part
analyzes the two approaches courts have taken to conditions
precedent. First, the strengths and weaknesses of each approach are analyzed. Next, this Part considers the two approaches in light of the balancing tests used by the courts in
determining the proper balance between the competing interests behind the Fourth Amendment: namely, society’s interest
in effective law enforcement and the competing interest of individuals in protecting the privacy of their homes from unreasonable searches. Finally, this Part provides answers to three
questions that arise once the particularity approach is adopted:
1) How much discretion should be allowed the executing officers;
2) How does the cure-by-affidavit principle effect the particularity approach; and
3) What impact, if any, should anticipatory warrants have
on the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement?
A. Comparing Approaches to Conditions Precedent
As the Ninth Circuit recognized, there are two approaches
to an anticipatory warrant’s conditions precedent. One approach requires that the conditions precedent be on the face of
the warrant, creating an additional particularity requirement.
The other approach treats conditions precedent as necessary
only for the magistrate’s probable cause determination.81 Both
approaches have strengths and weaknesses which tend to mirror each other; the failing of one approach is the strength of the
other. The Ninth Circuit, however, addressed only one weakness of the probable cause approach and the reciprocal strength
of the particularity approach, disregarding other important
considerations. This section will consider additional strengths
and weaknesses of the two approaches to determine which one
in the warrant or in the affidavit in support of the anticipatory warrant”); United
States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that “the magistrate must
set conditions governing an anticipatory warrant that are ‘explicit, clear, and narrowly
drawn so as to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents’ ” (quoting United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703-04 (2d Cir. 1989)).
80. See Hotal, 143 F.3d 1223.
81. See id. at 1226.
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more effectively protects Fourth Amendment interests.
1. Literal reading versus overall intent

The strongest argument in favor of the probable cause approach is that it conforms to the literal text of the Fourth
Amendment. As the Tenth Circuit noted, “the United States
Constitution only requires that a search . . . not be unreasonable, and that warrants . . . be supported by probable cause.”82
While the text of the amendment also requires a particular description of the place, persons, and items to be searched or
seized, it does not include a similar requirement for the time of
execution.83 There is no requirement that the exact grounds for
probable cause must be recited in the warrant.84 Therefore,
once conditions precedent are considered as a matter only of
probable cause, a court clearly is justified in holding that they
do not have to be recited in the warrant. They need only appear
in the affidavit, because it is the affidavit upon which the magistrate bases his or her determination of probable cause.85 Under this approach, time-based conditions precedent are relevant only in a postexecution review to assure that probable
cause did exist when the warrant was executed.86 While the
82. United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting
United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 965 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. IV)) (alteration in original).
83. See U.S. CONST. amend IV.
84. See Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1087.
Certainly, the most efficient way to ensure that an anticipatory warrant is
properly executed is to include the conditions for its execution in the warrant.
We will not posit a Fourth Amendment violation requiring suppression, however, when constitutionally satisfactory conditions for execution of the warrant are stated in the affidavit that solicits the warrant, accepted by the issuing magistrate, and actually satisfied in the execution of the warrant.
Id.
85. See Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1087 (holding warrant not constitutionally defective for failing to list the conditions precedent for execution where the conditions
precedent were included in the application affidavit); United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d
1423, 1427 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the court was “not compelled by the Constitution to require [the conditions precedent to appear in the warrant] since all that is constitutionally required is that the search warrant be supported by probable cause”);
United States v. Rey, 923 F.2d 1217, 1221 (6th. Cir. 1991) (holding that although it is
preferable to include the conditions precedent in the warrant, non-inclusion does not
void the warrant if it can be inferred from the affidavit that the warrant is only to be
executed after the triggering events do occur).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Koelling, 992 F.2d 817, 823 (8th Cir. 1993) (reviewing validity of warrant and noting that from the facts of the case, “it is clear that the
execution of the warrant occurred after the controlled delivery had taken place”).
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particularity approach is not a literal reading of the amendment, it arguably is more consistent with the amendment’s intent.
The probable cause approach looks at the text of the
amendment as distinct units: there is a probable cause requirement and a particularity requirement. The particularity
approach, on the other hand, extends the probable cause requirement by considering the amendment in its entirety. The
particularity requirement’s purpose is to ensure that the
search does not extend into those areas and for those things for
which probable cause to search does not exist. Although the
magistrate does not have to express in the warrant every reason for finding probable cause, the particularity requirement
does require that the magistrate express the extent of intrusion
justified by probable cause. The Fourth Amendment, as a
whole, requires a magistrate to express in the warrant exactly
what the probable cause has justified. Conditions precedent,
even though a matter of probable cause, also relate to when the
magistrate has authorized a search. In keeping with the theme
of the Fourth Amendment, timing should be included in the
warrant.
Requiring the warrant to contain a description of when
probable cause has justified a search is not as large of an innovation as it might seem. The time for execution usually is part
of even traditional warrants. In a traditional warrant, the magistrate includes a description of the time for the warrant to be
served as “forthwith.” If the police wait too long before executing the warrant, the probable cause upon which it is based becomes stale and the warrant is no longer valid.87 To deal with
the staleness issue, jurisdictions have adopted bright line rules
requiring execution of the warrant within a specified number of
days.88 The time requirement in anticipatory warrants is just
87. See United States v. Gibson, 123 F.3d 1121, 1124 (8th Cir. 1997) (“A delay in
executing a search warrant may render stale the probable cause finding.”).
88. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1) (requiring that the warrant “command the officer to search, within a specified period of time not to exceed 10 days, the person or
place named for the property or person specified”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1534 (West
1998) (ten days); FLA. STAT. ch. 933.05 (1998) (ten days); IDAHO CODE § 19-4412 (1998)
(ten days); N.Y. CRIM. P. LAW § 690.30 (McKinney 1998) (ten days); TEX. CODE CRIM.
P. ANN. art. 18.06 (West 1998) (three days); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-205(2) (1998)
(“The search warrant shall be served within ten days from the date of issuance. Any
search warrant not executed within this time shall be void and shall be returned to the
court or magistrate as not executed.”); see generally RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE
SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 166-89, Chart
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as important, not because probable cause will cease to exist,
but because probable cause presently does not exist. Before the
triggering event occurs, probable cause to search does not exist.
This is the exact issue that was presented to the Hotal court.
In Hotal, the magistrate issued a warrant which authorized
and directed law enforcement officers to search the premises
forthwith without any qualifying language to inform the police
that the warrant could not be served until the contraband had
been delivered. When the warrant was issued, probable cause
to search Hotal’s premises did not exist; the probable cause requirement was satisfied only upon the contraband’s delivery.
The warrant that issued was, therefore, beyond the scope justified by probable cause because there was no justification for
searching “forthwith.”89 A warrant that authorizes more than
probable cause would justify is clearly void.
2. The exclusion solution
The second argument for accepting the probable cause approach is that an overly technical requirement is not needed to
protect Fourth Amendment rights.90 When a court determines
that the evidence is on a sure course to a location, it is usually
because law enforcement is in possession of the contraband,
controlling its delivery.91 To invalidate the warrant and, therefore, invalidate the search as the Ninth Circuit did in Hotal,
seems like a ridiculous result when the police see the package
III (1985).
89. However, a warrant that authorizes a search forthwith that also contains
conditions precedent is not necessarily void. See United States v. Ruddell, 71 F.3d 331
(9th Cir. 1995). The term “forthwith” generally means that the warrant must be executed before the statutory time for execution has elapsed. See id. at 333. As long as the
conditions precedent and execution are accomplished before the statutorily proscribed
time period, the warrant is still valid. See id.
90. In other areas of Fourth Amendment analysis the courts have warned
against hypertechnical standards. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,
109 (1965) (holding that “the courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting
the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.”); United States
v. Giacalone, 541 F.2d 508, 514 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that “warrants are not to be
read in a negative or hypertechnical manner”).
91. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1203 n.3 (10th Cir.
1998); United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 530 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423 (7th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d
653, 655 (9th Cir. 1984) (invalidating an anticipatory warrant to search the defendant’s
house because the evidence was not on a sure course to the site desired to be searched
since the warrant merely required that the defendant take possession of the box containing contraband at the post office).
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accepted by the defendant and taken into his or her home. Can
there be any doubt in such a situation that contraband will be
found at the site of the search? In addition, a hypertechnical
requirement is not needed because the exclusionary rule acts
as a general deterrent to keep police from executing the warrant before the conditions precedent occur.92 Under the exclusionary rule, if the warrant is executed before the conditions
precedent occur, the evidence will be suppressed. Knowing this,
the police will have no incentive to execute the warrant prematurely even if it does not contain the conditions precedent on its
face.
The reliance of probable-cause courts on the exclusionary
rule, however, ignores the framers’ intent in drafting the
Fourth Amendment. The framers provided for specific presearch protections. The framers could have merely required
that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated,”93 but that was not enough. The
framers provided for enumerated pre-search protections. Specifically, a warrant cannot issue unless it is based upon probable cause and particularly describes those areas for which
probable cause exists. Requiring the warrant to include the
conditions precedent is consistent with the particularity provisions of the warrant clause. It is for this reason that the Ninth
Circuit rejected the probable cause approach. The Hotal court
found that the probable cause approach “fail[ed] to meet any of
the concerns set forth in [the Ninth Circuit’s] past cases.”94
Those concerns include informing both the police and the suspect of the search and its authorized scope.95 The probable
cause approach does not concern itself with such ramifications.
Instead, the approach focuses solely on the role of conditions
precedent in the magistrate’s probable cause analysis and
leaves protections to the exclusionary rule.
In addition, the exclusionary rule would not apply in many
circumstances where anticipatory warrants are executed prematurely. Generally, when an anticipatory warrant is executed
92. See United States v. Tagbering, 985 F.2d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 1993) (“If the
warrant is executed before the controlled delivery occurs, then suppression may well be
warranted for that reason.”).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
94. United States v. Hotal, 143 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998).
95. See id.
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early, it is void,96 and the evidence found as a result of the
search may be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.97 The
evidence, however, is not automatically excluded, as the exclusionary rule is subject to good faith exceptions.98 If the “officers
reasonably rel[y] on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate . . . such evidence should be admissible in the
prosecution’s case in chief.”99 Most notably, the police are allowed to rely on a warrant’s validity as long as it is not “facially
deficient.” Thus, in some cases, under probable cause analysis,
the good faith exception could result in the admission of evidence seized prematurely under an incomplete anticipatory
warrant.
The truth of this statement can be better understood in the
form of the following scenario: Police officers in a probable
cause jurisdiction become aware that drugs are being shipped
through the mail to an individual’s home. The officers would
like to search the home as soon as the drugs arrive and, therefore, seek an anticipatory warrant. In the application affidavit,
the officers request a warrant which will be executed only after
the contraband has been delivered to the house and taken inside. The magistrate, satisfied that probable cause will exist as
long as the warrant is not executed until after the conditions in
the affidavit have occurred, signs the warrant. However, the
warrant itself does not include the conditions precedent (the
warrant could even contain an authorization to search “forthwith”). Acting on the warrant, police search the premises, but
do so before the evidence has been delivered. Even though the
drugs have not yet been delivered, the officers find other evidence of criminal activity. Should the evidence be suppressed?
The warrant is void because it was executed prematurely.
Therefore, initially the answer is yes, the evidence should be
suppressed. However, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule must be applied. Here, there is no evidence that
the magistrate did not act in a neutral and detached manner or
that there was no justification for the magistrate’s probable
cause determination. Therefore, the police are entitled to rely
96. See United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir. 1989).
97. See Tagbering, 985 F.2d at 950 (“If the warrant is executed before the controlled delivery occurs, then suppression may well be warranted for that reason.”); see
also FED. R. CRIM. P. (41)(f); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
98. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
99. Id. at 913.
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upon that determination. The police would also be able to rely
on the warrant because it was not facially deficient. The warrant looked like any other which would authorize immediate
search. Even if the issuing magistrate informed the applying
officers that the warrant should not be executed until the affidavit’s conditions precedent were fulfilled, this admonition may
not be passed on to the executing officers.100 Unless the defendant could find subjective reasons to defeat the executing officers’ belief that the warrant was valid when executed, the evidence would be admitted.
Therefore, despite the acceptance by probable cause courts
of the proposition that conditions precedent are integral to the
validity of an anticipatory warrant, premature execution of
warrants is not sufficiently protected against under the probable cause approach. This situation occurs because these courts
fail to concede what has been conceded in other areas of Fourth
Amendment analysis—that the warrant and the affidavit considered by the magistrate are two separate documents which
serve differing purposes. Until these courts concede this difference, their admonitions that “magistrates issuing such warrants must protect against opportunities for . . . unfettered discretion, in part by explicitly placing conditions on execution”101
will make little sense. If the conditions precedent do not appear
on the warrant, where has the magistrate explicitly placed
conditions on execution?102 Do these courts assume that verbal
instructions will be given by the magistrate to the applying officers? How is it to be guaranteed that this admonition will be
passed on to the executing officers,103 especially when, for purposes of the good faith exception, it may be best not to pass
along the admonition?104
The particularity approach answers these questions by requiring the conditions precedent to appear on the warrant. The
magistrate does not have to rely upon a verbal admonition being passed along because each executing officer can read the
warrant and ascertain what events must occur before the warrant is valid. With less opportunity for abuse, an anticipatory
100. See United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1996).
101. United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998) (summarizing part of the holding in United States v. Riciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1993)).
102. See id.
103. See Leidner, 99 F.3d at 1429.
104. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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warrant in a particularity jurisdiction provides greater protection of Fourth Amendment rights.
B. The Particularity Approach and Balancing Tests
The Fourth Amendment represents a marker between two
competing interests. On one side is the interest in being secure
from unjustified government intrusion into private areas. On
the other side is society’s interest in effective law enforcement.
As a marker, the Fourth Amendment can be moved toward one
interest or the other depending on how the courts choose to interpret the wording and intent of the Amendment. In deciding
where the marker should be, courts consider the two interests
and try to strike the appropriate balance. This section discusses the particularity approach to conditions precedent in
terms of the Supreme Court’s “reasonableness” balancing test
and the unwritten pragmatic balancing test.
1. The “reasonableness” balancing test
The Supreme Court’s “reasonableness” balancing test involves the balancing of “the intrusion on the individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”105 “[T]here is ‘no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need
to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or
seizure] entails.’ ”106 Originally, the balancing test was only
used to determine when a search was reasonable outside of the
warrant requirements.107 However, the Supreme Court has
been willing to expand the use of the balancing test beyond its
original application.108 Therefore, even though the balancing

105. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990).
106. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967)) (alterations in the original).
107. See generally Buie, 494 U.S. 325; see, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (applying the balancing test to highway sobriety checkpoints);
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (applying the balancing test to a school official’s warrantless search of a student’s purse); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (applying the balancing test to stop-and-frisk situations).
108. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Use of a such a
‘balancing test’ to determine the standard for evaluating the validity of a full-scale
search represents a sizable [sic] innovation in Fourth Amendment analysis.”); cf. Terry,
392 U.S. 1. Even in T.L.O., however, the court was using the balancing test in
considering the “ ‘reasonableness’ standard whose only definite content is that it is not
the same test as the ‘probable cause’ standard found in the text of the Fourth
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test previously has not been used on the particularity clause of
the Fourth Amendment, such an analysis is not without justification. The balancing test is especially applicable to conditions
precedent since a requirement that they appear on the face of
the warrant can only be implied from the text and purposes
behind the Fourth Amendment. As an implied requirement it
is, therefore, especially appropriate to determine whether it is
reasonable.
Since the courts have agreed that conditions precedent are
vital to the validity of an anticipatory warrant under the probable cause requirement109 (an area of the Fourth Amendment
not covered by the balancing test because it is part of the warrant clause), this Note will not consider the general burden imposed on law enforcement or the benefits received by citizens
by requiring conditions precedent. Instead, this section focuses
on the marginal burdens and benefits of requiring an anticipatory warrant to contain the conditions precedent on its face as
an implied particularity term rather than deeming their inclusion in the affidavit considered by the magistrate to be sufficient.110
At issue here are potential intrusions into the most private
and important of all areas—the home—against a general governmental interest in enforcing its laws. Prohibiting unreasonable, extended governmental intrusions into the home is one of
the most important interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. This interest must be balanced against the government’s
interest in effective law enforcement. On its own, a general
governmental interest in enforcing laws has not been enough to
tip the scales in favor of the probable cause approach to anticipatory warrants. This general interest must be accompanied by
a more specific and important interest.111 Allowing the conditest as the ‘probable cause’ standard found in the text of the Fourth Amendment.”
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 354 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding
that the “conditions precedent . . . are integral to [an anticipatory warrants] validity”);
United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that anticipatory warrants are not per se unconstitutional “so long as the conditions precedent to
execution are clearly set forth in the warrant or in the affidavit in support of the anticipatory warrant”).
110. Recognizing, of course, that if this were an express requirement of the warrant clause, the balancing test would not be applicable.
111. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-24 (approving stop-and-frisks because of a “concern[] with more than the governmental interest in investigating crime” and recognizing the additional “need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other
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tions precedent to appear only in the affidavit considered by
the magistrate for her probable cause determination would
promote no specific interest beyond the government’s general
interest in effective law enforcement. On the other hand, potential intrusions into homes weighs as a substantial interest
in favor of requiring conditions precedent to be included in the
warrant.
2. The pragmatic balancing test
The pragmatic balancing test arises from the recognition
that courts sometimes use the law to “reach[] a predetermined
conclusion.”112 Even though the “reasonableness” balancing test
weighs the burden placed upon the individual against the interests of law enforcement that are promoted, it would be naive
not to admit that courts also consider the inverse—the burden
a requirement would impose on law enforcement versus the
benefit to the individual. Again, this section will consider only
the marginal burden placed upon law enforcement by requiring
the conditions precedent to appear on the face of the warrant
versus the marginal benefit to Fourth Amendment interests
gained by such a requirement.
The burden on law enforcement could be significant if officers choose not to include conditions precedent on the face of
the warrant. However, this is unlikely to become a major problem. Officers are interested in making sure that seized evidence will not be suppressed. They also clearly understand that
a warrant must contain a particular description of the places to
be searched and items to be seized. It is well within the ability
of law enforcement to understand that conditions precedent
must be included on the face of an anticipatory warrant or the
evidence will be suppressed. After all, it makes sense that if the
evidence upon which probable cause to issue the warrant is
based has not yet reached the intended location of the search,
the warrant should not state that police have the authority to
search the premises “forthwith.” This minimal burden on law
prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause to arrest”); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339 (upholding the search of student’s purse by a school principal because of “the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining
discipline in the classroom and on school grounds”); but see Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding sobriety checkpoints based upon the state
interest in eradicating drunk driving).
112. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 367 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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enforcement is balanced against the need to protect citizens
against the premature execution of an anticipatory search warrant.113 Once again, the balancing test clearly favors requiring
the conditions precedent to appear on the face of the warrant.
C. Unanswered Questions of the Particularity Approach

Even courts which hold that conditions precedent must appear on the face of the warrant must determine what standard
should be used to review conditions precedent, whether law enforcement should be given greater discretion in the area of anticipatory warrants, and whether a failure in the warrant can
be cured by the affidavit.
1. Discretion of the executing officers

In the area of anticipatory warrants, courts have required
that the conditions precedent be “explicit, clear, and narrowly
drawn.”114 But under traditional particularity analysis, the description in the warrant has to be such that it leaves no discretion to the executing officer as to what places to search and
what items to seize.115 Carrying over this analysis would necessitate that the terms “explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn” be
interpreted to mean that no discretion be left to the executing
officers as to when the search is to be conducted. The warrant
would have to outline the conditions precedent with enough
particularity so as to leave no question as to when the executing officers are to perform the search. However, the word
“when” must be used in its proper sense. It should not be interpreted as requiring the magistrate to include a date and time
when the warrant must be executed. Even traditional warrants
usually can be executed up to ten days after being issued.116
Rather than defining “when” as a date and time, courts should
look at the term “when” as a point within a continuum of
events. The warrant must, with enough particularity to eliminate police discretion, describe at what point within a chain of
events the police can execute the search warrant.

113. See, e.g., United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1993); United
States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1992) (upholding search based on erroneous conclusion that the warrant at issue was not anticipatory).
114. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 13.
115. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976).
116. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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Besides addressing how particular a warrant must be in delineating the time of execution, courts must also address the
appropriate level of particularity with which the place and
items to be searched or seized must be described. As previously
discussed, at least one court has allowed the particularity
standard to be lower when dealing with an anticipatory warrant instead of with a traditional warrant.117 Although the
court did not address this issue specifically, there is some justification for this position. First, anticipatory warrants are used
in an area where law enforcement has previously relied upon
exigent circumstances to search. If the police could search under the exigent circumstances exception but instead choose to
obtain a warrant, the courts should be willing to allow less particularity in the warrant. Requiring the same type of particularity that must be present in a traditional warrant may lead
law enforcement to return to relying on exigent circumstances
rather than obtaining a warrant, and citizens would therefore
be less protected than they would be if police were getting less
specific warrants issued from neutral magistrates. Second, the
Fourth Amendment could be read as a single requirement for a
reasonable search. The court could determine that reasonableness requires a less particular warrant when dealing with anticipatory warrants. However, these are not sufficient justifications for accepting these positions.
First, it should be noted that “a warrant conditioned on a
future event presents a potential for abuse above and beyond
that which exists in more traditional settings . . . .”118 Therefore, the interest in limiting the chances of abuse should be
more rather than less in the area of anticipatory warrants.
Second, the exigent circumstances exception may no longer be
viable in certain circumstances where an anticipatory warrant
can be obtained,119 so the idea that police should be given more
leeway because they could search anyway does not exist. Third,
the reading of the amendment as one large reasonableness requirement does not fit with past interpretation. The standard
for determination of what constitutes a particular description
has been treated separately from the reasonableness requirement in the past. All searches must be reasonable and all war-

117. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
118. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12.
119. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
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rants must contain a particular description. Lowering the
standard of what constitutes a particular description in an area
where there is greater opportunity for abuse would undermine
the entire warrant requirement.
Once the standard of particularity is set, courts must then
set a standard for review in determining whether the warrant
contains enough particularity. The review of the particularity
of conditions precedent should be in conformity with other areas of particularity analysis. The description should, therefore,
“be one of reasonable specificity,” and be read “not ‘hypertechnical[ly]’, but in a ‘commonsense’ fashion.”120 There is “no justification for a stricter standard in respect to specificity of time
than in respect to the other two (constitutionally referenced)
search parameters.”121
2. Cure by affidavit

Another issue that is relevant to particularity considerations is the doctrine of cure by affidavit. Generally, the affidavit cannot be considered in assessing the particularity of the
warrant because of the distinction between the two documents.
However, all of the circuit courts will allow the specificity in
the affidavit to cure the warrant in limited situations. Although this issue has not yet been specifically addressed by the
Supreme Court, the Court has implied that it too will approve
the practice.122
There is no reason why cure by affidavit should not be applicable to a description of the time of execution to the same extent it is applicable to descriptions of the place and items for
which to search. If there is “no justification for a stricter standard in respect to specificity of time,”123 there is clearly no justification for a more stringent standard for cure by affidavit.
Therefore, the description in the warrant should be curable by
a specific description in the warrant if the standards of cure by
affidavit are met.124 What must be avoided, however, is a lower
120. United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 966 (1st Cir. 1994) (alteration in
origional) (citations omitted).
121. Id. (emphasis omitted).
122. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990 n.7 (1984) (implying that
the affidavit could have cured the warrant if the judge had crossed out the description
in the warrant and attached the affidavit).
123. Gendron, 18 F.3d at 966.
124. Until the Supreme Court rules on the issue of cure by affidavit, there will
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standard of cure by affidavit. A lower standard of cure by affidavit would undermine the requirement that the time of execution be included in the warrant. It would allow the probable
cause approach, which requires only that the conditions precedent be in the affidavit, to undermine the particularity approach.
3. The effect of anticipatory warrants on exigent circumstances
Under limited circumstances, the courts have upheld certain types of searches performed without a warrant. These exceptions have been permitted only “when ‘special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ”125 One such exception is the exigent circumstances exception. Under this exception, police can search without a warrant if there is “ ‘a great
likelihood that the evidence will be destroyed or removed before
a warrant can be obtained.’ ”126 The evidence must be subject to

continue to be confusion among the circuit courts over what the proper standard for
cure by affidavit should be. Currently, there is a five way split among the circuits as to
what the proper standard should be. The Tenth Circuit is the only circuit that requires
the affidavit to be expressly incorporated by the warrant and be attached to the warrant. See United States v. Dahlman, 13 F.3d 1391 (10th Cir. 1993). The First, Third,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits require that the warrant incorporate the affidavit and that
the affidavit accompany the warrant. See United States v. Towne, 997 F.2d 537 (9th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 677, 681 n.3 (1st Cir. 1992); United States
v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311 (8th
Cir. 1976). The Fourth and Fifth Circuits will cure an insufficient warrant if the affidavit is either incorporated by the warrant or accompanies the warrant. See United
States v. Beaumont, 972 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Washington, 852
F.2d 803, 805 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1981),
corrected by 664 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1981). The D.C. Circuit requires that the warrant
expressly incorporate the affidavit and requires that the circumstances show that the
equivalence of having the affidavit accompany the warrant occurred. See United States
v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam). The Second, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits require only the functional equivalence of incorporation and accompany. See
United States v. Jones, 54 F.3d 1285 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d
1112 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1982). The
Sixth Circuit uses two different standards depending on whether the warrant erroneously describes the place to be searched or whether the description is absent. See
United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 1162 (6th Cir. 1995) (Batchelder, J., dissenting);
United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001 (6th cir. 1991); United States v. Gahagan,
865 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1989). For an in depth discussion of the topic of cure by affidavit, see generally EchoHawk & EchoHawk, supra note 10.
125. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)).
126. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.5(b), at 342 (quoting State v. Patterson, 220
N.W.2d 235 (Neb. 1974)).
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destruction or removal “before a warrant can be obtained.”127
With the acceptance of anticipatory warrants, a search warrant
can now be obtained before the evidence has even reached the
locus of the search. Some courts have seemed to imply that
even though the police can now obtain a warrant in advance of
the delivery of the contraband, they retain the option of searching under the exigent circumstances exception.128 However, the
continued acceptance of exigent circumstances searches in
these situations would be contrary to the preferred practice of
obtaining a warrant. In anticipatory warrant situations where
law enforcement is in control of the delivery of the contraband,
the evidence is not subject to destruction or removal until the
police place it in that situation. To allow the police to create the
exigent circumstance when they could have delayed delivery
long enough to obtain a warrant defeats the warrant requirement. In some circumstances, even though police do have possession of the contraband or are controlling its delivery, there
will not be enough time to obtain a warrant. For example, if the
police intercept a drug courier minutes before he reaches the
intended location of his delivery, the police may still deliver the
illegal narcotics and search the premises without an anticipatory warrant under the exigent circumstances exception. On
the other hand, where contraband is located in the mails and
police have several days to obtain a warrant, an exigent circumstance would not exist. Courts will have to determine on a
case-by-case basis when an opportunity to obtain an anticipatory warrant negates the existence of an exigent circumstance.
V. CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit correctly decided that a warrant’s facial
identification of conditions precedent is “not merely ‘efficient’ or
preferable; it is indeed the only way effectively to safeguard

127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. See United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 1346, 1348 n.2 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Although several hours passed between the time of the phone call and the time of the delivery, the police obtained neither a search nor an arrest warrant. We note that a more
prudent procedure would have been to obtain a conditional ‘anticipatory’ search warrant.”); United States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 903 n.6 (11th Cir. 1990) (“We know of no
precedent, . . . that requires law enforcement officials to try to obtain an anticipatory
warrant if they may possibly be able to justify one.”); United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d
1267, 1270-71 n.3 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Appellants have directed us to no federal case purporting to require that the government obtain an anticipatory search warrant.”).
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against unreasonable and unbounded searches.”129 By requiring
conditions precedent to appear on the face of a warrant, the
particularity approach ensures that both the police and the
subject of the search will be informed of the time at which the
warrant properly may be executed. In the situation described
in the Introduction, I was worried about the police coming to
search my apartment even though I had nothing to hide but
the two pounds of marijuana someone had decided to ship using my post office box as the return address. At least I knew
that the police might possibly be coming and the reason for
their visit. If, on the other hand, they had arrived at my
apartment with a warrant authorizing a search “forthwith,”
and I had not yet picked up my mail, I can only imagine the
feeling of shock I would have then felt and the resentment I
would still be feeling to this day. The Fourth Amendment is
meant to offer real protection to all citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. The probable cause approach to
conditions precedent for anticipatory warrants does not provide
enough protection of Fourth Amendment interests. The particularity approach, on the other hand, does.
Instead of focusing on each individual clause in the Fourth
Amendment, the particularity approach considers the intent of
the amendment as a whole, recognizing the relationship between the particular description and probable cause phrases.
By extending the requirement that the warrant must contain a
description of the authorized intrusion also to include a time
element, the particularity approach continues to provide the
protection the framers intended.
The particularity approach further conforms to the framers’
intent by requiring judicial review prior to execution of any
warrant rather than relying on the ex post facto exclusionary
rule. Waiting until after the warrant has been executed to determine when the warrant was authorized to be served, as
would occur under the probable cause approach, allows too
many opportunities for Fourth Amendment rights to be subverted. Exclusion is not the solution; the framers intended that
unreasonable police intrusions would be stopped before they
occur.
Finally, the particularity approach protects these interests
with minimal additional burdens on law enforcement. Under
129. United States v. Hotal, 143 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998).
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the status quo, it has been clearly established that conditions
precedent are vital to the validity of anticipatory warrants. The
particularity approach merely requires that these vital conditions be included on the face of the anticipatory warrant.130
This is a very small burden to impose on law enforcement in relation to the protection it provides. In light of these considerations, the particularity approach is, therefore, the better choice
for placing conditions precedent within the Constitutional
framework.
Brett R. Hamm

130. Unless the terms are in an affidavit that can properly be considered under
the cure by affidavit doctrine. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.

